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Abstract
In the differentially private top-k selection problem, we are given a dataset X ∈ {±1}n×d , in
which each row belongs to an individual and each column corresponds to some binary attribute,
and our goal is to find a set of k d columns whose means are approximately as large as possible.
Differential privacy requires that our choice of these k columns does not depend too much on
any on individual’s dataset. This problem can be solved using the well known exponential
mechanism and composition properties of differential privacy. In the high-accuracy regime,
where we require the error of the selection procedure to be to be smaller than the so-called
sampling error α ≈√ln(d)/n, this procedure succeeds given a dataset of size n & k ln(d).
We prove a matching lower bound, showing that a dataset of size n & k ln(d) is necessary for
private top-k selection in this high-accuracy regime. Our lower bound is the first to show that
selecting the k largest columns requires more data than simply estimating the value of those k
columns, which can be done using a dataset of size just n & k.
*IIT Madras, Department of Computer Science and Engineering. This research was performed while the author was a
visiting scholar at Northeastern University. mitali.bafna@gmail.com
†Northeastern University, College of Computer and Information Science. jullman@ccs.neu.edu
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1 Introduction
The goal of privacy-preserving data analysis is to enable rich statistical analysis of a sensitive
dataset while protecting the privacy of the individuals who make up that dataset. It is especially
desirable to ensure differential privacy [DMNS06], which ensures that no individual’s information
has a significant influence on the information released about the dataset. The central problem
in differential privacy research is to determine precisely what statistics can be computed by
differentially private algorithms and how accurately they can be computed.
The seminal work of Dinur and Nissim [DN03] established a “price of privacy”: If we release the
answer to & n statistics on a dataset of n individuals, and we do so with error that is asymptotically
smaller than the sampling error of ≈ 1/√n, then an attacker can reconstruct nearly all of the
sensitive information in the dataset, violating any reasonable notion of privacy. For example, if
we have a dataset X = (x1, . . . ,xn) ∈ {±1}n×d and we want to privately approximate its marginal
vector q = 1n
∑n
i=1 xi , then it is suffices to introduce error of magnitude Θ(
√
d/n) to each entry of
q [DN03, DN04, BDMN05, DMNS06], and this amount of error is also necessary [BUV14, SU15].
Thus, when d n, the error must be asymptotically larger the sampling error.
Top-k Selection. In many settings, we are releasing the marginals of the dataset in order to find
a small set of “interesting” marginals, and we don’t need the entire vector. For example, we may
be interested in finding only the attributes that are unusually frequent in the dataset. Thus, an
appealing approach to overcome the limitations on computing marginals is to find only the top-k
(approximately) largest coordinates of the marginal vector q, up to some error α.1
Once we find these k coordinates, we can approximate the corresponding marginals with
additional error O(
√
k/n). But, how much error must we have in the top-k selection itself? The
simplest way to solve this problem is to greedily find k coordinates using the differentially private
exponential mechanism [MT07]. This approach finds the top-k marginals up to error .
√
k log(d)/n.
The sparse vector algorithm [DNPR10, RR10, HR10] would provide similar guarantees.
Thus, when k d, we can find the top-k marginals and approximate their values with much less
error than approximating the entire vector of marginals. However, the bottleneck in this approach
is the
√
k log(d)/n error in the selection procedure, and this log(d) factor is significant in very
high-dimensional datasets. For comparison, the sampling error for top-k selection is ≈√log(d)/n so
the error introduced is asymptotically larger than the sampling error when k log(d) n. However,
the best known lower bound for top-k selection follows by scaling down the lower bounds for
releasing the entire marginal vector, and say that the error must be &
√
k/n.
Top-k selection is a special case of fundamental data analysis procedures like variable selection
and sparse regression. Moreover, private algorithms for selection problems underlie many power-
ful results in differential privacy: private control of false discovery rate [DSZ15], algorithms for
answering exponentially many queries [RR10, HR10, GRU12, JT12, Ull15], approximation algo-
rithms [GLM+10], frequent itsemset mining [BLST10], sparse regression [ST13], and the optimal
analysis of the generalization error of differentially private algorithms [BNS+16]. Therefore it is
important to precisely understand optimal algorithms for differentially private top-k selection.
Our main result says that existing differentially private algorithms for top-k selection are
essentially optimal in the high-accuracy regime where the error is required to be asymptotically
smaller than the sampling error.
1Here, the algorithm has error α if it returns a set S ⊆ {1, . . . ,d} consisting of of k coordinates, and for each coordinate
j ∈ S, qj ≥ τ −α, where τ is the k-th largest value among all the coordinates {q1, . . . , qd }.
1
Theorem 1.1 (Sample Complexity Lower Bound for Approximate Top-k). There exist functions
n =Ω(k log(d)) and α =Ω(
√
log(d)/n) such that for every d and every k = do(1), there is no differentially
private algorithm M that takes an arbitrary dataset X ∈ {±1}n×d and (with high probability) outputs an
α-accurate top-k marginal vector for X.
Tracing Attacks. Our lower bounds for differential privacy follow from a tracing attack [HSR+08,
SOJH09, BUV14, SU15, DSS+15, DSSU17]. In a tracing attack, the dataset X consists of data for n
individuals drawn iid from some known distribution over {±1}d . The attacker is given data for a
target individual y ∈ {±1}d who is either one of the individuals in X (“IN”), or is an independent
draw from the same distribution (“OUT”). The attacker is given some statistics about X (e.g. the
top-k statistics) and has to determine if the target y is in or out of the dataset. Tracing attacks are
a significant privacy violation, as mere presence in the dataset can be sensitive information, for
example if the dataset represents the case group in a medical study [HSR+08].
Our results give a tracing attack for top-k statistics in the case where the dataset is drawn
uniformly at random. For simplicity, we state the properties of our tracing attack for the case of
the exact top-k marginals. We refer the reader to Section 4 for a detailed statement in the case of
approximate top-k marginals, which is what we use to establish Theorem 1.1.
Theorem 1.2 (Tracing Attack for Exact Top-k). For every ρ > 0, every n ∈N, and every k d 2n
such that k log(d/k) ≥O(n log(1/ρ)), there exists an attackerA : {−1,1}d ×{0,1}d → {IN,OUT} such that
the following holds: If we choose X = (x1, . . . ,xn) ∈ {±1}n×d uniformly at random, and t(X) is the exact
top-k vector2 of X, then
1. If y ∈ {±1}d is uniformly random and independent of X, then P [A(y, t(X)) = OUT] ≥ 1− ρ, and
2. for every i ∈ [n], P [A(xi , t(X)) = IN] ≥ 1− ρ.
While the assumption of uniformly random data is restrictive, it is still sufficient to provide
a lower bound for differential privacy. Tracing attacks against algorithms that release the en-
tire marginal vector succeed under weaker assumptions—each column can have a different and
essentially arbitrary bias as long as columns are independent. However, for top-k statistics, a
stronger assumption on the column biases is necessary—if the column biases are such that t(X)
contains a specific set of columns with overwhelming probability, then t(X) reveals essentially
no information about X, so tracing will fail. Under the weaker assumption that some unknown
set of k columns “stand out” by having significantly larger bias than other columns, we can use
the propose-test-release framework [DL09] to find the exact top-k vector when n & log(d). An
interesting future direction is to characterize which distributional assumptions are sufficient to
bypass our lower bound.
We remark that, since our attack “traces” all rows of the dataset (i.e. A(xi , t(X)) = IN for every
i ∈ [n]), the attack bears some similarities to a reconstruction attack [DN03, DMT07, DY08, KRSU10,
KRS13, NTZ13]. However, the focus on high-dimensional data and the style of analysis is much
closer to the literature on tracing attacks.
1.1 Proof Overview
Our results use a variant of the inner product attack introduced in [DSS+15] (and inspired by the
work on fingerprinting codes [BS98, Tar08] and their connection to privacy [Ull13, BUV14, SU15]).
2Due to the presence of ties, there is typically not a unique top-k. For technical reasons, and for simplicity, we let t(X)
denote the unique lexicographically first top-k vector and refer to it as “the” top-k vector.
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Given a target individual y ∈ {±1}d , and a top-k vector t ∈ {±1}d , the attack is
A(y, t) =
IN if 〈y, t〉 ≥ τOUT otherwise
where τ = Θ(
√
k) is an appropriately chosen threshold. The key to the analysis is to show that,
when X = (x1, . . . ,xn) ∈ {±1}n×d and y ∈ {±1}d are chosen uniformly at random, t(X) is an accurate
top-k vector of X, then
E [〈y, t(X)〉] = 0 and ∀i ∈ [n] E [〈xi , t(X)〉] > 2τ.
If we can establish these two facts then Theorem 1.2 will follow from concentration inequalities for
the two inner products.
Suppose t(X) is the exact top-k vector. Since each coordinate of y is uniform in {±1} and
independent of X, we can write
E [〈y, t(X)〉] = ∑jE [yj · t(X)j] = ∑jE [yj]E [t(X)j] = 0.
Moreover, for every fixed vector t ∈ {±1}d with k non-zero coordinates, 〈y, t〉 is a sum of k indepen-
dent, bounded random variables. Therefore, by Hoeffding’s inequality we have that 〈y, t〉 =O(√k)
with high probability. Since y,X are independent, this bound also holds with high probability
when X is chosen randomly and t(X) is its top-k vector. Thus, for an appropriate τ = Θ(
√
k),
A(y, t(X)) = OUT with high probability.
Now, consider the case where y = xi is a row of X, and we want to show that E [〈xi , t(X)〉] is
sufficiently large. Since X is chosen uniformly at random. One can show that, when k d 2n, the
top-k largest marginals of X are all at least γ =Ω(
√
log(d/k)/n). Thus, on average, when t(X)j = 1,
we can think of xi,j ∈ {±1} as a random variable with expectation ≥ γ . Therefore,
E [〈xi , t(X)〉] = E
[∑
j:t(X)j=1 xi,j
]
≥ kγ =Ω
(
k
√
log(d/k)/n
)
Even though xi and t(X) are not independent, and do not have independent entries, we show that
with high probability over the choice of X, 〈xi , t(X)〉 ≥ k
√
log(d/k)/n−O(√k) with high probability.
Thus, if k log(d/k) & n, we have that A(xi , t(X)) = IN with high probability.
Extension to Noisy Top-k. The case of α-approximate top-k statistics does not change the analysis
of 〈y, t〉 in that case that y is independent of x, but does change the analysis of 〈xi , t〉 when xi is a
row of X. It is not too difficult to show that for a random row xi , E[〈xi , tˆ〉] & k(γ −α), but it is not
necessarily true that 〈xi , t〉 is large for every row xi . The problem is that for relevant choices of α, a
random dataset has many more than k marginals that are within α of being in the top-k, and the
algorithm could choose a subset of k of these to prevent a particular row xi from being traced. For
example, if there are 3k columns of X that could be chosen in an α-accurate top-k vector, then with
high probability, there exists a vector t specifying k of the columns on which xi = 0, which ensures
that 〈xi , t〉 = 0.
We can, however, show that 〈xi , tˆ〉 > τ for at least (1 − c)n rows of X for an arbitrarily small
constant c > 0. This weaker tracing guarantee is still enough to rule out (ε,δ)-differential privacy
for any reasonable setting of ε,δ (Lemma 2.5), which gives us Theorem 1.1. The exact statement
and parameters are slightly involved, so we refer the reader to Section 4 for a precise statement
and analysis of our tracing attack in the case of approximate top-k statistics (Theorem 4.1).
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2 Preliminaries
Definition 2.1 (Differential Privacy). For ε ≥ 0,ρ ∈ [0,1] we say that a randomized algorithm
M : {±1}n×d →R is (ε,δ)-differentially private if for every two datasets X,X ′ ∈ {±1}n×d , such that
X,X ′ differ in at most one row, we have that,
∀S ⊆R P [M(X) ∈ S] ≤ eε ·P[M(X ′) ∈ S]+ δ.
Definition 2.2 (Marginals). For a dataset X ∈ {±1}n×d , its marginal vector q(X) = (q1(X), . . . , qd(X)) is
the average of the rows of X. That is, qj(X) =
1
n
∑n
i=1Xi,j . We use the notation
q(1)(X) ≥ q(2)(X) ≥ . . . ≥ q(d)(X)
to refer to the sorted marginals. We will also define pi : [d]→ [d] to be the lexicographically first
permutation that puts the marginals in sorted order. That is, we define pi so that qpi(j) = q(j) and if
j < j ′ are such that qj = qj ′ , then pi(j) < pi(j ′).
Definition 2.3 (Accurate Top-k Vector). Given a dataset X ∈ {±1}n×d and a parameter α ≥ 0, a
vector tˆ ∈ {0,1}d is an α−accurate top-k vector of X if,
1. tˆ has exactly k non-zero coordinates, and
2. (tˆi = 1)⇒ (qi(X) ≥ q(k)(X)−α).
When α = 0, we define the exact top-k vector of X as t(X) ∈ {0,1}d to be the lexicographically first
0-accurate top-k vector.3 Specifically, we define t(X) so that
(t(X)j = 1)⇔ j ∈ {pi(1), . . . ,pi(k)}.
We refer to these set of columns as the top-k columns of X.
For comparison with our results, we state a positive result for privately releasing an α-
approximate top-k vector, which is an easy consequence of the exponential mechanism and
composition theorems for differential privacy
Theorem 2.4. For every n,d,k ∈N, and ε,δ,β ∈ (0,1), there is an (ε,δ)-differentially private algorithm
that takes as input a dataset X ∈ {±1}n×d , and with probability at least 1−β, outputs an α-accurate top-k
vector of X, for
α =O
√k · ln(1/δ) · ln(kd/β)εn

2.1 Tracing Attacks
Intuitively, tracing attacks violate differential privacy because if the target individual y is outside
the dataset, then A(y,M(X)) reports OUT with high probability, whereas if y were added to the
dataset to obtain X ′, A(y,M(X ′)) reports IN with high probability. Therefore M(X),M(X ′) must
have very different distributions, which implies thatM is not differentially private. The next lemma
formalizes and quantifies this property.
3Due to ties, there may not be a unique 0-accurate top-k vector of X. For technical reasons we let t(X) be the unique
lexicographically first 0-accurate top-k vector, so we are justified in treating t(X) as a function of X.
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Lemma 2.5 (Tracing Violates DP). LetM : {±1}n×d →R be a (possibly randomized) algorithm. Suppose
there exists an algorithm A : {±1}d ×R → {IN,OUT} such that when X ∼ {±1}n×d and y ∼ {±1}d are
independent and uniformly random,
1. (Soundness) P [A(y,M(X)) = IN] ≤ ρ
2. (Completeness) P [# {i | A(xi ,M(X)) = IN} ≥ n−m] ≥ 1− ρ.
Then M is not (ε,δ)-differentially private for any ε,δ such that eερ + δ < 1 − ρ − mn . If ρ < 1/4 and
m > 3n/4, then there are absolute constants ε0,δ0 > 0 such that M is not (ε0,δ0)-differentially private.
The constants ε0,δ0 can be made arbitrarily close to 1 by setting ρ and m/n to be appropriately
small constants. Typically differentially private algorithms typically satisfy (ε,δ)-differential
privacy where ε = o(1),δ = o(1/n), so ruling out differential privacy with constant (ε,δ) is a strong
lower bound.
2.2 Probabilistic Inequalities
We will make frequent use of the following concentration and anticoncentration results for sums
of independent random variables.
Lemma 2.6 (Hoeffding Bound). Let Z1, . . . ,Zn be independent random variables supported on {±1}, and
let Z = 1n
∑n
i=1Zi . Then
∀ν > 0 P [Z −E[Z] ≥ ν] ≤ e− 12ν2n.
Hoeffding’s bound on the upper tail also applies to random variables that are negative-dependent,
which in this case means that setting any set of the variables B to +1 only makes the variables in
[n] \B more likely to be −1 [PS97]. Similarly, if the random variables are positive-dependent (their
negations are negative-dependent), then Hoeffding’s bound applies to the lower tail.
Theorem 2.7 (Chernoff Bound). Let Z1, . . . ,Zn be a sequence of independent {0,1}-valued random
variables, let Z =
∑n
i=1Zi , and let µ = E[Z]. Then
1. (Upper Tail) ∀ν > 0 P [Z ≥ (1 + ν)µ] ≤ e− ν22+ν µ, and
2. (Lower Tail) ∀ν ∈ (0,1) P [Z ≤ (1− ν)µ] ≤ e− 12ν2µ.
Theorem 2.8 (Anticoncentration [LT13]). Let Z1, . . . ,Zn be independent and uniform in {±1}, and let
Z = 1n
∑n
i=1Zi . Then for every β > 0, there exists Kβ > 1 such that for every n ∈N,
∀v ∈
[
Kβ√
n
,
1
Kβ
]
P [Z ≥ ν] ≥ e− 1+β2 ν2n.
3 Tracing Using the Top-k Vector
Given a (possibly approximate) top-k vector t of a dataset X, and a target individual y, we define
the following inner product attack.
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Aρ,d,k(y, t) :
Input: y ∈ {±1}d and t ∈ {0,1}d . Let τ = √2k ln(1/ρ).
If 〈y, t〉 > τ , output IN; else output OUT.
In this section we will analyze this attack when X ∈ {±1}n×d is a uniformly random matrix, and
t = t(X) is the exact top-k vector of X. In this case, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 3.1. There is a universal constant C ∈ (0,1) such that if ρ > 0 is any parameter and n,d,k ∈N
satisfy d ≤ 2Cn, k ≤ Cd and k ln(d/2k) ≥ 8n ln(1/ρ), then Aρ,d,k has the following properties: If X ∼
{±1}n×d , y ∼ {±1}d are independent and uniform, and t(X) is the exact top-k vector of X, then
1. (Soundness) P
[
Aρ,d,k(y, t(X)) = IN
]
≤ ρ, and
2. (Completeness) for every i ∈ [n], P
[
Aρ,d,k(xi , t(X)) = OUT
]
< ρ+ e−k/4.
We will prove the soundness and completeness properties separately in Lemmas 3.2 and 3.3,
respectively. The proof of soundness is straightforward.
Lemma 3.2 (Soundness). For every ρ > 0, n ∈ N, and k ≤ d ∈ N, if X ∼ {±1}n×d , y ∼ {±1}d are
independent and uniformly random, and t(X) is the exact top-k vector, then
P
[
〈y, t(X)〉 ≥
√
2k ln(1/ρ)
]
≤ ρ.
Proof. Recall that τ :=
√
2k ln(1/ρ). Since X,y are independent, we have
P
X,y
[〈y, t(X)〉 ≥ τ]
=
∑
T⊆[d]:|T |=k
P
X,y
[
〈y, t(X)〉 ≥ τ ∣∣∣ t(X) = IT ] ·P
X
[t(X) = IT ]
=
∑
T⊆[d]:|T |=k
P
y
∑
j∈T
yj ≥ τ
 ·PX [t(X) = IT ] (X,y are independent)
≤ max
T⊆[d]:|T |=k
P
y
∑
j∈T
yj ≥ τ

For every fixed T , the random variables {yj}j∈T are independent and uniform on {±1}, so by
Hoeffding’s inequality,
P
∑
j∈T
yj ≥
√
2k ln(1/ρ)
 ≤ ρ.
This completes the proof of the lemma.
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We now turn to proving the completeness property, which will following immediately from the
following lemma.
Lemma 3.3 (Completeness). There is a universal constant C ∈ (0,1) such that for every ρ > 0, n ∈N,
d ≤ 2Cn, and k ≤ Cd, if X ∼ {±1}n×d is chosen uniformly at random, t(X) is the exact top-k vector, and xi
is any row of X,
P
〈xi , t(X)〉 ≤ k
√
ln(d/2k)
n
−
√
2k ln(1/ρ)
 ≤ ρ+ e−k/4.
To see how the completeness property of Theorem 3.1 follows from the lemma, observe if
k ln(d/2k) ≥ 8n ln(1/ρ), then k√ln(d/2k)/n −√2k ln(1/ρ) ≥ τ . Therefore Lemma 3.3 implies that
P [〈xi , t(X)〉 < τ] ≤ ρ+ e−k/4, so P
[
Aρ,d,k(xi , t(X)) = IN
]
≥ 1− ρ − e−k/4.
Before proving the lemma, we will need a few claims about the distribution of 〈xi , t(X)〉. The
first claim asserts that, although X ∈ {±1}n×d is uniform, the k columns of X with the largest
marginals are significantly biased.
Claim 3.4. There is a universal constant C ∈ (0,1), such that for every n ∈N, d ≤ 2Cn and k ≤ Cd, if
X ∈ {±1}n×d is drawn uniformly at random, then
P
q(k)(X) <
√
ln(d/2k)
n
 ≤ e−k/4.
Proof of Claim 3.4. For every j ∈ [d], define Ej to be the event that
qj =
1
n
∑
i∈[n]
xij >
√
ln(d/2k)
n
.
We would like to apply Theorem 2.8 to the random variable 1n
∑
i xij . To do so, we need√
ln(d/2k) /n ∈
[
K1√
n
,
1
K1
]
where K1 is the universal constant from that theorem (applied with β = 1). These inequalities will
be satisfied as long as d ≤ 2Cn, and k ≤ Cd for a suitable universal constant C ∈ (0,1). Applying
Theorem 2.8 gives
∀j ∈ [d] P
[
Ej
]
= P
qj >
√
ln(d/2k)
n
 ≥ 2kd .
By linearity of expectation, we have that E[
∑
j Ej ] ≥ 2k. Since the columns of X are independent,
and the events Ej only depend on a single column of X, the events Ej are also independent.
Therefore, we can apply a Chernoff bound (Theorem 2.7) to
∑
j Ej to get
P
 d∑
j=1
Ej < k
 ≤ e−k/4.
If
∑
j Ej ≥ k, then there exist k values qj that are larger than
√
ln(d/2k)
n , so q(k) is also at least this
value. This completes the proof of the claim.
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The previous claim establishes that if we restrict X to its top-k columns, the resulting matrix
Xt ∈ {±1}n×k is a random matrix whose mean entry is significantly larger than 0. This claim is
enough to establish that the inner product 〈xi , t(X)〉 is large in expectation over X. However, since
XT its columns are not necessarily independent, which prevents us from applying concentration to
get the high probability statement we need. However, the columns of Xt are independent if we
condition on the value and location of the (k + 1)-st marginal.
Claim 3.5. Let X ∈ {±1}n×d be a random matrix from a distribution with independent columns, and let
t(X) be its marginals. For every q ∈ [−1,1], k, j ∈ [d],T ∈ ([d]k ), the conditional distribution
X | (q(k+1) = q)∧ (pi(k + 1) = j)∧ (t(X) = IT )
also has independent columns.
Proof of Claim 3.5. Suppose we condition on the value of the (k + 1)-st marginal, q(k+1) = q, its loca-
tion, pi(k+ 1) = j, and the set of top-k marginals t = IT . By definition of the (exact, lexicographically
first) top-k vector, we have that if ` < j, then ` ∈ T if and only if q` ≥ q. Similarly, if ` > j, then
` ∈ T if and only if q` > q. Since we have conditioned on a fixed tuple (q, j,T ), the statements q` > q
and q` ≥ q now depend only on the `-th column. Thus, since the columns of X are independent,
they remain independent even when condition on any tuple (q, j,T ). Specifically, if ` < j and ` ∈ T ,
then column ` is drawn independently from the conditional distribution ((u1, . . . ,un) | 1n
∑
i ui ≥ q),
where (u1, . . . ,un) ∈ {±1}n are chosen independently and uniformly at random. Similarly, if ` > j
and ` ∈ T , then column ` is drawn independently from ((u1, . . . ,un) | 1n
∑
i ui > q).
Now we are ready to prove Lemma 3.3.
Proof of Lemma 3.3. For convenience, define γ =
√
ln(d/2k)
n and τc = kγ −
√
2k ln(1/ρ). Fix any row xi
of X. We can write
P [〈xi , t(X)〉 < τc]
≤ P
[
〈xi , t(X)〉 < τc
∣∣∣ q(k+1) ≥ γ]+P [q(k+1) < γ]
≤ P
[
〈xi , t(X)〉 < τc
∣∣∣ q(k+1) ≥ γ]+ e−k/4 (Claim 3.4)
≤ max
q≥γ,j∈[d],T ∈([d]k )
P
[
〈xi , t(X)〉 < τc
∣∣∣ (q(k+1) = q)∧ (pi(k + 1) = j)∧ (t(X) = IT )]+ e−k/4 (1)
Let Gq,j,T be the event (q(k+1) = q)∧ (pi(k + 1) = j)∧ (t(X) = IT ). By linearity of expectation, we can
write
E
[
〈xi , t(X)〉 < τc
∣∣∣ Gq,j,T ] ≥ kq ≥ kγ.
Using Claim 3.5, we have that
∑
`:t(X)`=1 xi` conditioned on Gδ,j,T is a sum of independent {±1}-
valued random variables. Thus,
P
[
〈xi , t(X)〉 < τc | Gq,j,T
]
= P
[
〈xi , t(X)〉 < kγ −
√
2k ln(1/ρ) | Gq,j,T
]
≤ P
[
〈xi , t(X)〉 < kq −
√
2k ln(1/ρ) | Gq,j,T
]
(q ≥ γ)
≤ ρ (Hoeffding)
Combining with (1) completes the proof.
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4 Tracing Using an Approximate Top-k Vector
In this section we analyze the inner product attack when it is given an arbitrary approximate top-k
vector.
Theorem 4.1. For every ρ > 0, there exist universal constants C,C′ ∈ (0,1) (depending only on ρ) such
that if d ∈N is sufficiently large and n,d,k ∈N and α ∈ (0,1) satisfy
d ≤ 2Cn, k ≤ dC , n = C′k ln(d/2k), and α ≤ C
√
ln(d/2k)
n
,
and tˆ : {±1}n×d → {0,1}d is any randomized algorithm such that
∀X ∈ {±1}n×d P
[
tˆ(X) is an α-approximate top-k vector for X
]
≥ 1− ρ,
then Aρ,d,k (Section 3) has the following properties: If X ∼ {±1}n×d , y ∈ {±1}d are independent and
uniform, then
1. (Soundness) P
[
Aρ,d,k(y, t(X)) = IN
]
≤ ρ, and
2. (Completeness) P
[
#
{
i ∈ [n] ∣∣∣ Aρ,d,k(xi , tˆ(X)) = IN } < (1− e2ρ)n] < 2ρ+ 2e−k/6.
The proof of the soundness property is nearly identical to the case of exact statistics so we will
focus only on proving the completeness property.
Intuitively, the proof of completeness takes the same general form as it did for the case of exact
top-k statistics. First, for some parameter γ > 0, with high probability X has at least k marginals
that are at least γ . Therefore, any marginal j contained in any α-accurate top-k vector has value
qj ≥ λ := γ − α. From this, we can conclude that the expectation of 〈xi , tˆ(X)〉 ≥ k(γ − α) where
the expectation is taken over the choices of X, tˆ(X), and i. However, unlike the case of the exact
marginals, the k columns selected by tˆ may be significantly correlated so that for some choices of i,
〈xi , tˆ(X)〉 is small with high probability. At a high level we solve this problem as follows: first, we
restrict to the set of dλ columns j such that qj ≥ γ −α, which remain mutually independent. Then
we argue that for every fixed α-accurate top-k vector specifying a subset of k of these columns,
with overwhelming probability the inner product is large for most choices of i ∈ [n]. Finally, we
take a union bound over all
(dλ
k
)
possible choices of α-accurate top-k vector. To make the union
bound tolerable, we need that with high probability dλ is not too big. Our choice of γ was such
that only about k columns are above γ , therefore if we take λ very close to γ , we will also be able
to say that dλ is not too much bigger than k. By assuming that the top-k vector is α-accurate for
α γ , we get that λ = γ −α is very close to γ .
Before stating the exact parameters and conditions in Lemma 4.4, we will need to state and
prove a few claims about random matrices.
Claim 4.2. For every β > 0, there is a universal constant C ∈ (0,1) (depending only on β), such
that for every n ∈ N, d ≤ 2Cn and k ≤ Cd, if X ∈ {±1}n×d is drawn uniformly at random, then for
γ :=
√
2
1+β · ln(d/2k)n , we have
P
[
q(k)(X) < γ
]
≤ e−k/4.
The above claim is just a slightly more general version of Claim 3.4 (in which we have fixed
β = 1), so we omit its proof.
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Claim 4.3. For every n,d ∈N and every λ ∈ (0,1), if X ∈ {±1}n×d is drawn uniformly at random, then
for dλ := 2d exp(−12λ2n)
P
[
#
{
j
∣∣∣ qj > λ } > dλ] ≤ e−dλ/6.
Proof of Claim 4.3. For every j ∈ [d], define Ej to be the event that qj = 1n
∑
i xij > λ. Since the xij ’s
are independent, applying Hoeffding’s bound to
∑
i xij gives,
∀j ∈ [d] P
[
Ej
]
= P
[
qj > λ
]
≤ e−λ2n/2.
By linearity of expectation, we have that E[
∑
j Ej ] ≤ de−λ2n/2 = 12dλ. Since the columns of X are
independent, we can apply a Chernoff bound (Theorem 2.7) to
∑
j Ej , which gives
P
[∑d
j=1Ej > dλ
]
≤ e−dλ/6.
This completes the proof of the claim.
Now we are ready to state our exact claim about the completeness of the attack when given an
α-accurate top-k vector.
Lemma 4.4 (Completeness). For every ρ > 0, there exist universal constants C2,C3,C4,C5 ∈ (0,1)
(depending only on ρ) such that if n,d,k ∈N and α ∈ (0,1) satisfy,
4k ≤min{(2d)C2 ,4C4d}, 8n ln(1/ρ) = C23k ln(2d), d ≤ 2C4n α ≤ C5
√
ln(2d)
n
,
and tˆ is an algorithm that, for every X ∈ {±1}n×d , outputs an α-accurate top-k vector with probability at
least 1− ρ, then for a uniformly random X ∈ {±1}n×d , we have
P
[
#
{
i ∈ [n] | 〈xi , tˆ(X)〉 ≥ τc
}
< (1− e2ρ)n
]
< 2ρ+ e−k/4 + e−k/6,
where τc := C3k
√
ln(2d)
n −
√
2k ln(1/ρ).
To see how the completeness property of Theorem 4.1 follows from the lemma, observe if
8n ln(1/ρ) = C23k ln(2d), then
τc = C3k
√
ln(2d)
n
−
√
2k ln(1/ρ) =
√
2k ln(1/ρ) = τ
where τ is the threshold in Aρ,d,k . Therefore Lemma 4.4 implies that
P
[
#
{
i ∈ [n] ∣∣∣ Aρ,d,k(xi , tˆ(X)) = IN } < (1− e2ρ)n] < ρ+ e−k/4 + e−k/6.
The universal constants C,C′ will be C = min{C2,C4,C5} − δ for an arbitrarily small δ > 0, and
C′ = C23 . As long as d is sufficiently large the conditions k ≤ dC in Theorem 4.1 will imply the
corresponding condition in the above lemma.
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Proof of Lemma 4.4. First, we will condition everything on the event
Gα := {tˆ = tˆ(X) is an α-accurate top-k vector of X}.
By assumption, for every X ∈ {±1}n×d , P [Gα] ≥ 1− ρ.
For convenience define the constant c := e2ρ, so that the lemma asserts that, with high probabil-
ity, A(xi , tˆ(X)) = IN for at least (1− c)n rows xi . As in the proof of completeness for the case of exact
top-k, we will first condition on the event that at least k marginals are above the threshold γ . Now,
by Claim 4.2, with an appropriate choice of
β :=
c
16ln(1/ρ)
γ :=
√
2
1 + c16ln(1/ρ)
·
√
ln(d/2k)
n
,
and the assumptions that k ≤ C4d and d ≤ 2C4n for some universal constant C4 depending only on
β, the event
Gγ :=
q(k)(X) ≥ γ = C1
√
ln(2d)
n
 ,
will hold with probability 1− e−k/4. Here we define the universal constants
C1 :=
√
2
1 + c8ln(1/ρ)
C2 :=
c
2c+ 4ln(1/ρ)
.
depending only on ρ. These constants were chosen so that provided 4k ≤ (2d)C2 , the inequality in
the definition of Gγ will be satisfied.
In light of the above analysis, we condition the rest of the analysis on the event Gγ , which is
satisfies P
[
Gγ
]
≥ 1− e−k/4.
If we condition on Gα and Gγ , then for any marginal j chosen by tˆ (i.e. tˆj = 1), then we can say
that qj ≥ λ for any λ ≤ γ −α. Now, we define the constants
C3 :=
√
2
1 + c4ln(1/ρ)
C5 := C1 −C3 > 0,
where one can verify that the inequalityC1−C3 > 0 holds for all choices of c. Now by our assumption
that α < C5
√
ln(2d)
n , we can define λ := C3
√
ln(2d)
n .
For any matrix X ∈ {±1}n×d , we can define Sλ = Sλ(X) ⊆ {1, . . . ,d} to be the set of columns of X
whose marginals are greater than λ. The analysis above says that, conditioned onGγ and Gα, if
tˆj = 1, then j ∈ Sλ. Note that, if X is chosen uniformly at random, and we define X≥λ ∈ {±1}n×|Sλ| to
be the restriction of X to the columns contained in Sλ, then the columns of X≥λ remain independent.
The size of Sλ is a random variable supported on {0,1, . . . ,d}. In our analysis we will need to
condition on the even that |Sλ|  d. Using Claim 4.3 we have that if
dλ := 2de
− λ2n2
then the event
GS := {|Sλ(X)| ≤ dλ}
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satisfies P [GS ] ≥ 1 − e−dλ/6 ≥ 1 − e−k/6 where we have used the fact that dλ ≥ k. This fact is not
difficult to verify form our choice of parameters. Intuitively, since λ ≤ γ , and there are at least
k marginals larger than γ , there must also typically be at least k marginals larger than λ. We
condition the remainder of the analysis on the event GS .
Later in the proof we require that the size of Sλ is small with high probability. Using Claim 4.3
we can say that the size of Sλ is at most dλ = 2de
− λ2n2 with probability at least, 1 − e−dλ/6. When
q(k) ≥ γ , the number of marginals greater than λ would be at least k. So dλ > k and the error
probability e−dλ/6 is at most e−k/6. We will henceforth condition on the event that |Sλ(X)| ≤ dλ.
We will say that the attackA fails on tˆ when we fail to trace more than cn rows, i.e. A fails when∣∣∣{i : 〈xi , tˆ〉 < kλ−√2k ln(1/ρ)}∣∣∣ > cn = e2ρn. Formally we have that,
P
[
A fails on tˆ
]
≤ P
[
A fails on tˆ ∧Gα ∧Gγ ∧GS
]
+P
[
¬Gα ∨¬Gγ ∨¬GS
]
≤ P
[
A fails on tˆ ∧Gα ∧Gγ ∧GS
]
+ ρ+ e−k/4 + e−k/6 (2)
Thus, to complete the proof, it suffices to show that
P
[
A fails on tˆ ∧Gα ∧Gγ ∧GS
]
= P
[
(A fails on tˆ)∧ (tˆ is α-accurate)∧ (q(k) ≥ γ)∧ (|Sλ| ≤ dλ)
]
≤ P
[
(A fails on tˆ)∧ (tˆ ⊆ Sλ)∧ (|Sλ| ≤ dλ)
]
≤ P
[(
∃v ∈
(
Sλ
k
)
A fails on v
)
∧ (|Sλ| ≤ dλ)
]
where we have abused notation and written tˆ ⊆ Sλ to mean that tˆj = 1 =⇒ j ∈ Sλ, and used v ∈ (Sλk )
to mean that v is a subset of Sλ of size exactly k.
We will now upper bound P
[
(∃v ∈ (Sλk ) A fails on v)∧ (|Sλ| ≤ dλ)] . Observe that, since the
columns of X are identically distributed, this probability is independent of the specific choice
of Sλ and depends only on |Sλ|. Further, decreasing the size of Sλ only decreases the probability.
Thus, we will fix a set S of size exactly dλ and assume Sλ = S. Thus, for our canonical choice of set
S = {1, . . . ,dλ}, we need to bound P
[
∃v ∈ (Sk) A fails on v] .
Consider a fixed vector v ⊆ S. That is, a vector v ∈ {0,1}d such that vj = 1 =⇒ j ∈ S. Define the
event Ei,v to be the event that 〈xi ,v〉 is too small for some specific row i and some specific vector
v ⊆ S. That is,
Ei,v :=
{
〈xi ,v〉 < τc := kλ−
√
2k ln(1/ρ)
}
.
Since the columns of XS are independent, for a fixed i and v, by Hoeffding’s inequality gives
P
[
Ei,v
]
= P
[∑
j:vj=1 xi,j < τc
]
≤ ρ.
We have proved that the probability that 〈xi ,v〉 is small, is small for a given row. We want to
bound the probability that 〈xi ,v〉 is small for an entire set of rows R ⊆ [n]. Unfortunately, since we
require that qj ≥ λ for every column j ∈ S, the rows xi are no longer independent. However, the
rows satisfy a negative-dependence condition, captured in the following claim.
Claim 4.5. For every R ⊆ [n],
P
∧
i∈R
Ei,v
 ≤ ρ|R|.
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To maintain the flow of the analysis, we defer the proof of this claim to Section 4.1
By definition,A fails on v only if there exists a set R of exactly cn = e2ρn rows such that ∧i∈REi,v .
Taking a union bound over all such sets R and all v , we have
P
[
∃v ∈
(
S
k
)
A fails on v
]
≤
(
dλ
k
)
·
(
n
cn
)
· ρcn
≤
(
edλ
k
)k
·
(enρ
cn
)cn
≤ dkλ · e−cn
where we have used the identity
(a
b
) ≤ ( eab )b. We have already set the parameter λ, and set dλ =
2de− λ
2n
2 . Thus, all that remains is to show that for our choice of parameters dkλ · e−cn ≤ ρ, which is
equivalent to cn ≥ ln(1/ρ) + k ln(dλ). Substituting our choice of λ gives the condition
kλ2n
2
≥ ln(1/ρ) + k ln(2d)− cn
One can check that, for our choice of n = C
2
3k ln(2d)
8ln(1/ρ) , and our choice of λ = C3
√
ln(2d)
n where C3 has
been defined above, the preceding equation is satisfied.
Thus, we have established that
P
[
∃v ∈
(
S
k
)
A fails on v
]
≤ dkλ · e−cn ≤ ρ.
As we have argued above, this implies that
P
[
A fails on tˆ
]
≤ 2ρ+ e−k/4 + e−k/6
This completes the proof of the completeness lemma.
4.1 Proof of Claim 4.5
Recall that, for a given X ∈ {±1}n×d , Ei,v is the event that 〈xi ,v〉 < τc for a specific row i and a specific
vector v ⊆ S, where S = Sλ is the set of columns j of X such that qj ≥ λ. Thus, we can think of
XS ∈ {±1}n×|S | as a matrix with |S | independent columns that are uniformly random subject to the
constraint that each column’s mean is at least λ. Since, flipping some entries of XS from −1 to +1
can only increase 〈xi ,v〉, we will in fact use the distribution X˜S in which each column’s mean is
exactly λn. Thus, when we refer to the probabilities of events involving random variables xi,j , we
will use this distribution on XS as the probability space. Additionally, since v is fixed, and the
probability is the same for all v, we will simply write Ei to cut down on notational clutter.
For a specific set R ⊆ [n], we need to calculate
P
XS
∧
i∈R
Ei
 .
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We can write
P
X˜S
∧
i∈R
Ei
 = P
X˜S
∧
i∈R
∑
j∈v
xij < τc


≤ P
X˜S
 ∑
i∈R,j∈v
xij < |R|τc
 . (3)
The key property of XS is that its entries xij are positively correlated. That is, for every set
I ⊂ [n]× S of variables xij , we have,
P
X˜S
[
∀(i, j) ∈ I xij = −1
]
≤
∏
(i,j)∈I
P
X˜S
[
xij = −1
]
. (4)
Since the columns of X˜S are independent if we partition the elements of I into sets I1, . . . , Ik,
where each set Il has pairs of I which come from the column l, then,
P
X˜S
[
∀(i, j) ∈ I xij = −1
]
=
∏
l∈[k]
P
X˜S
[
∀(i, j) ∈ Il xij = −1
]
.
So it is enough to show that equation 4 holds when I =
{
(i1, l), . . . , (ip, l)
}
. For simplicity of notation
we will refer to these elements of I as {1, . . . ,p}. We have that,
P [∀a ∈ I xa = −1] =
p∏
a=1
P
[
xa = −1
∣∣∣ (∀b ∈ {1, . . . , a− 1} ,xb = −1)] . (5)
We will show that each of the terms in the product is smaller than P [xa = −1]. For a fixed a ∈ I ,
let B be the set {1, . . . , a− 1} and let E be the event that (∀b ∈ B,xb = −1). Since every column of XS
sums to nλ, we have
E
∑
i∈[n]
xil
∣∣∣ B = nλ.
On the other hand, since the bits in B are all set to −1 and all the other bits in column l are equal in
expectation,
E
∑
i∈[n]
xil
∣∣∣ B = −|B|+ (n− |B|) · (E [xa ∣∣∣ B]) ,
which means that
E[xa
∣∣∣ B] ≥ λ = E[xa].
Since P [xa = −1] = (1−E[xa])/2, we get that P
[
xa = −1
∣∣∣ B] ≤ P [xa = −1]. Substituting this back
into (5), we get that the variables are positively correlated.
We have that,
E
 ∑
i∈R,j∈v
xij
 = |R|kλ,
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and since Hoeffding’s inequality applies equally well to positively-correlated random variables [PS97],
we also have
P
X˜S
 ∑
i∈R,j∈v
xij ≤ |R|τc
 ≤ PX˜S
 ∑
i∈R,j∈V
xij < |R|kλ− |R|
√
2k ln(1/ρ)
 ≤ exp
−
(
|R|√2k ln(1/ρ))2
2|R|k
 = ρ|R|.
Substituting this in equation 3, we get that,
P
X˜S
∧
i∈R
Ei
 ≤ ρ|R|.
Finally, we use the fact that, by our definition of the distributions XS , X˜S , we have
P
XS
∧
i∈R
Ei
 ≤ P
X˜S
∧
i∈R
Ei
 ≤ ρ|R|.
This completes the proof.
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